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Abstract

The increased incorporation of targeted killing, primarily through the use of unmanned
aerial vehicles, into United States policy raises salient questions regarding its consistency
with the U.S. Constitution. This paper contrasts interpretations of constitutional due
process with the current legal framework for conducting targeted killing operations. The
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution establishes the due process owed to U.S. citizens.
This paper determines that the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen, was
accomplished in a manner inconsistent with constitutional due process and demonstrates
an over-extension of executive branch power. This paper examines one scholarly
recommendation that seeks to increase the accountability of the executive and increase
the level of due process afforded citizens in the context of targeted killing.
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Targeted Killing: United States Policy, Constitional Law, and Due Process
Military warfare has existed since humankind’s earliest days. Although the
techniques and methods of warfare have continually changed, the objectives have not.
Nations typically seek stability, prosperity, and national security. As technologies have
developed, military techniques have become more specialized and sophisticated.
Historically, targeting specific individuals has been a common practice. The book of
Joshua records Ehud, a Benjaminite who acted as a judge for the Israelites, killing the
tyrannical King Eglon of Moab with a knife (Judges 3:12-30). World War I was triggered
through the targeted assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria.
Throughout World War II numerous attempts were made on the German leader Adolf
Hitler’s life.
Today, the focus of the targeted killing debate is largely centering on the use of
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missile strikes. Since President Barack Obama was
elected in 2008, he has increasingly exploited such tactics to accomplish national security
objectives. In fact, President Obama increased the use of drones so significantly that in
less than four years in office he authorized six times the number of strikes that the Bush
Administration authorized over eight years. Yet, during this time the percentage of strikes
that have killed militant leaders has decreased.1 While some have questioned the efficacy
of such strikes, legal questions also abound. This paper seeks to determine the place of
targeted killing relative to its constitutionality and to ascertain its viability as a
component of national security policy. In order to do this, a brief history and background
of targeted killing and the evolution of UAVs is necessary. This paper will also examine

1. Peter Bergen and Megan Braun, “Drone is Obama's weapon of choice,” CNN (September 19,
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/05/opinion/bergen-obama-drone (accessed April 26, 2013).
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the Department of Justice’s justification for killing American citizens to determine the
Department’s consistency in adhering to the Constitution’s due process requirements. An
analysis is provided of expansive executive power and its interaction with due process
rights. Solutions to the problem of insufficient due process will also be investigated and
compared with constitutional law in order to provide a path forward.
A Brief History of Targeted Killing
Targeted killing has been employed as a military strategy when a nation or
organization identifies a certain target as worthy of elimination. The actual term “targeted
killing” has only been in use for approximately a decade since Israel declared its policy
of “targeted killings” aimed at terrorists residing in Palestine.2 Before that nations and
individuals eliminated targets through a number of methods, but without a coherent
concept of what those actions constituted. Utilizing methods such as “sniper fire,
shooting at close range, missiles from helicopters, gunships, the use of car bombs, and
poison,” nations eliminated targets to accomplish their foreign policy objectives.3 The
common element between these killings was lethal intent rather than the method of
accomplishing them. The United Nation’s definition of targeted killing clarifies this
underlying intention:
A targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal
force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized
armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the
physical custody of the perpetrator.4

2. Philip Alston, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions,” Human Rights Council, 14th sess., add. 6, May 28, 2010: 4,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf (accessed January
30, 2014).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 3.
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Clearly, any killing committed involuntarily or accidentally falls outside the
bounds of targeting. Additionally, a killing committed by an individual without
authorization from his or her state would also be excluded. Alston explains that the
crucial factor must be premeditation, and not merely a last resort preparation.5 This
means that a “reckless” killing or one carried out without a conscious choice would not
be considered a targeted killing, nor would the elimination of a suspected suicide bomber
during a law enforcement operation, since the initial goal of the operation was not to
remove the suspect.6 Since this report was explicitly prepared by the United Nations, the
international community largely agrees with these definitions. Since the United Nations
lacks enforcement power, a definitional approach does nothing substantively to regulate
strikes.
Although these sorts of killings have gone on for many years, they have only
recently been highlighted. This newfound focus has mainly come about because of
technological advances. In particular, the development and mass commercialization of
UAVs has completely altered approaches to targeted killing. Drones have been around
for over six decades, and originally envisioned as a means to gather intelligence and
conduct surveillance and reconnaissance operations.7 Drone technology was modified to
contribute to wartime operations as weapons, first appearing in World War II as the
German FX-1400 “which consisted of a 2,300 pound bomb, dropped from an airplane

5. Alston, “Report of the Special Rapporteur,” 5.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 9.
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and steered by a pilot in the ‘mothership.’”8 Nevertheless, not much progress was made
with this early drone. At least in the United States, there was not a significant
technological investment in this direction until the Vietnam War. The U.S. experimented
with drones dubbed ‘Fireflies’ in order to conduct reconnaissance missions in Southeast
Asia; however, the program was discontinued when it went over budget.9
During the Lebanon War in 1982 the Israeli Air Force employed a weaponized
drone called the Pioneer, which demonstrated that other nations were also investigating
the technology.10 Investment accelerated in the latter 1980s and the United States
introduced its own version of the Pioneer during the Persian Gulf War.11 Yet at that point,
the use of drones for targeting individuals was still not widely implemented as a national
security tactic. When the attacks of 2001 occurred, U.S. strategy changed as the nation
saw the need to “hunt down terrorists in remote areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.”12 As
mentioned earlier, the use of drone strikes to accomplish targeted killings has continued
to increase after Barack Obama replaced George W. Bush as president. Clearly the ability
to eliminate targets without significant risk to military personnel is a powerful tool;
however, it is not one that is unique to the U.S. According to the United Nations, over 40
nations have the capacity to use drones in military operations, including some potentially

8. Andrew Callam, “Drone wars: Armed unmanned aerial vehicles.” International Affairs Review
18, no. 3 (Winter 2010), http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/144 (accessed April 24, 2013).
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
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hostile nations, such as Russia, China, and Iran.13 If there is confusion over the role and
legality of targeted killings, the continued development of drone technology and its
dissemination will only complicate the matter.
Constitutional Law and Targeted Killing
Although there is a lack of international law consensus regarding how to evaluate
the legality of targeted killings, an examination of the constitutional law of the United
States should provide a clearer legal picture. The framers of the Constitution constructed
the American republic to be one of diffused powers and divided authority. Nevertheless,
disputes exist regarding the Constitution’s application to executive prerogative and its use
of targeted killing. At the heart of the constitutional debate is the extrapolation of due
process norms.
Due Process and the Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment contains the constitutional basis of opposition to targeted
killing. This is because the crux of the controversy typically centers on the method by
which targeted killings are conducted and decided, rather than the targets themselves. The
portion of the text that specifically relates to due process is actually quite short and
concise. It says, “No person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”14 The legal concept of due process found in the Fifth Amendment should
be understood in relation to the First Amendment to the Constitution. The First
Amendment protects the people from infringements upon their right to free speech,

13. Alston, “Report of the Special Rapporteur,” 9.
14. U.S. Constitution, amend. 5.
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exercise of religion, press, assembly, or petition of grievances.15 It is understood that
persons who commit a crime, in most cases a felony, effectively give up aspects of their
constitutional rights. Persons who are or have been imprisoned frequently cannot vote or
move as freely as they desire. In capital cases, a person may receive the death penalty if
tried by a jury and found guilty through due process of law. A restriction of an
individual’s First Amendment right or of the natural rights of life, liberty, or property can
only occur in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment.
Although the Fifth Amendment does not specify what due process entails, the
context of the Constitution is crucial to understanding the clause’s intent. As is widely
known, the Founding Fathers were heavily influenced by British legal traditions, such as
Magna Charta, Petition of Right, Bill of Rights 1689, and English Common Law.
Particularly the principle of legality, which informed the framers’ meaning of due
process, is founded in Magna Charta 1215.16 The intention behind this due process was to
prohibit “unilateral, arbitrary action by the king against certain protected private
interests.”17 Here due process is seen to be closely linked to restrictions upon the King of
England, and was proactively added as a provision against the expansion of the executive
power of the United States.
Although in a technical sense “the due process of law” might refer to pleading
technicalities, contextually it is much more likely to refer to the principle of legality,
limiting infringements on one’s private rights by the government, and more specifically,
15. U.S. Constitution, amend. 1.
16. Gary Lawson, “Due Process Clause,” The Heritage Guide to the Constitution (2012),
http://www.heritage.org/constitution#!/amendments/5/essays/150/due-process-clause (accessed March 2,
2014).
17. Ibid.
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the executive.18 The confusion probably occurred because Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634)
had explained the terms “law of the land” and “the due process of law” as equivalent,
even though there were definitional distinctions between the two.19 Regardless of
possible confusion of terms, it is important to understand what was meant by the
individual tenets of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause. Both the original
meanings of life and liberty were largely influenced by the writings of Sir William
Blackstone (1723-1780). He identified liberty with a person’s ability to control his or her
movements or adapt to situational changes without risking imprisonment or restraint
except by the due course of law.20 Blackstone threw a wider net over the concept of life;
it encompassed an “array of rights lumped together under the general heading of personal
security.”21 Conveniently, the example of targeted killing mainly corresponds to the
taking of life and liberty because the meaning behind the term property is much more
ambiguous. Still, any infringement that is accomplished through a targeted killing would
certainly reach the level of a denial of both life and liberty.
Many assert that due process has too constrictive of an effect when attempting to
mitigate threats of terrorism. However, due process laws of the United States are not as
rigid as typically assumed. It is reasonable to suppose that due process differs depending
upon the context of the situation. Evers-Mushovic and Hughes concur by saying, “due
process balances the severity of the potential deprivation and the substantive grounds that
18. Lawson, “Due Process Clause.”
19. Ibid. Lawson indicates that the term “law of the land” had been associated with restraints on
government from depriving citizens of life, liberty, or property, which was probably the intentional
meaning of the framers. The term “the due process of law” had a technical meaning referring to the right of
a defendant to appear in court on order of a writ.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
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might justify that deprivation.”22 In other words, the process of determining procedures
can change based on circumstances. Depending on how severe the deprivation of rights
is, and how critical reasons are for its undertaking, due process might differ. In the
context of terrorist activities, both the individual being targeted and the U.S. government
have strong arguments. On the one hand, the individual who is targeted is potentially
losing his or her life, but on the other the government is attempting to avoid a
catastrophic loss of life. Applying a significant degree of due process might increase the
probability that a just decision is reached that properly balances the two claims and
enhances the decision-making ability of the executive.
The idea of a flexible due process was settled by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Mathews v. Eldridge. Drawing from Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy and Morrissey v.
Brewer, the Court’s opinion stated that due process “is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,” rather it is “flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”23 This flexibility
purportedly allows due process to be modified based on the distinct aspects of a case.
Specifically, the Court lays out three distinct factors that must be considered in order to
determine the level of due process necessary for a particular instance:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.24
22. Toren G. Evers-Mushovic and Michael Hughes, “Rules for When There are No Rules:
Examining the Legality of Putting American Terrorists in the Crosshairs Abroad,” New England Journal of
International and Comparative Law 18 (2012): 170, LexisNexis Academic (accessed April 16, 2013).
23. Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), 334.
24. Ibid., 335.
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Although Mathews v. Eldridge was not interpreted in the context of national security
policy,25 Richard Murphy and Afsheen John Radsan explain that the benefit of using the
case is that it “provides a general framework for developing” due process measures,
rather than “determinative answers.”26 In a similar way to how courts have developed a
due process for prisons, civil service, and public education, Mathews can be applied to
the context of targeted killing to assist in the creation of due process requirements.27
Despite the convenience of this “balancing test,” there are problems with such an
approach. Primarily, the implementation of such a test is extremely unpredictable.28
Eschewing a historical interpretation of what due process entails makes the guarantees of
the Fifth Amendment superfluous. If the Court can interpret what due process means and
the extent of its application based on this balancing test, then the government might not
be consistently limited from targeting suspected terrorists. Significantly changing the
meaning of due process based on the situation could lead to abuse. Also, the Court’s
assumption that these issues can be accurately weighed reflects a great deal of optimism
in judicial review.29 Despite this, Supreme Court precedent exists on the matter of due
process rights afforded citizens that were affiliated with terrorist organizations. In one
case in particular, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court used the balancing test
25. Mathews v. Eldridge, 319. As the opinion of the Court states, “The issue in this case is whether
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to the termination of Social Security
disability benefit payments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.”
26. Richard W. Murphy and Afsheen John Radsan, “Notice and an Opportunity To Be Heard
Before the President Kills You,” Wake Forest Law Review 48, no. 4 (Fall 2013): 858, LexisNexis
Academic (accessed February 2, 2014).
27. Ibid.
28. Lawson, “Due Process Clause.”
29. Ibid.
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outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge in order to determine the amount of process due an
American citizen.30 Court precedents are worthwhile to consider, since they provide some
interpretative guidelines.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld as an instructive case. The case of Yaser Esam Hamdi
investigates the situation of a United States citizen classified as an enemy combatant,
captured in Afghanistan, and detained at a naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina
without trial or due process.31 Although the ruling deals specifically with indefinite
detention rather than targeted killing, due process precedents have been extracted from
the case that provide valuable application. In the majority opinion, Justice O’Connor
holds, “due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy
combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that
detention before a neutral decisionmaker.”32
In a petition submitted by Hamdi’s father, the elder Hamdi alludes that “Hamdi’s
detention in the United States without charges, access to an impartial tribunal, or
assistance of counsel ‘violated and continue[s] to violate the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.’”33 The elder Hamdi continued further on
behalf of his son’s innocence, declaring that Hamdi was present in Afghanistan to
conduct relief work and not participate in military training against the United States.34
Nevertheless, the majority opinion of the Court upheld that the capture and detainment of
30. Murphy and Radsan, “Notice and an Opportunity,” 858.
31. Hamdi et al v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al., 542 U.S. 507 (2004), 507.
32. Ibid., 509.
33. Ibid., 511.
34. Ibid.
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Hamdi was authorized based upon the Authorization for Use of Military Force 2001
(AUMF).35
The key facet to this case related to targeted killing is the due process owed a
citizen, even if he or she has been properly detained by the U.S. government. Thus,
through the AUMF, the United States had the proper authorization to detain Hamdi as an
enemy combatant, because the “‘necessary and appropriate force’ referenced in the
congressional resolution necessarily includes the capture and detention of any and all
hostile forces.”36 Still, the Court held that even if the detention was legitimate, Hamdi’s
situation warranted access to the rights of due process reserved for all U.S. citizens. Even
if his detainment was legitimate, the government did not have the authority to strip him of
his constitutional rights. Although Hamdi was not the subject of a targeted strike, his
enemy combatant status makes his situation comparable. For example, if capturing
Hamdi had not been feasible, would the United States have had the legal right to
terminate his life? Assuming that all other factors remained constant, Hamdi could have
been denied the right to due process, and targeted by the U.S. government, if his capture
proved too difficult.
This Supreme Court case would at least offer some support to the idea that the
executive branch cannot rescind a citizen’s Fifth Amendment rights if they are considered
an enemy combatant or impossible to capture. There exists scholarly support for this
stance. For example, Thompson writes that the presence of war or conflict does not
entirely abrogate the rights of citizens of the U.S. He posits that “it is only logical that if
due process limitations apply to detention during armed conflict then similar limitations
35. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 509.
36. Ibid., 515.
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would also apply to targeting during armed conflict.”37 Nevertheless, some might oppose
extending due process rights to terrorists, even if they are due those rights as American
citizens. In a court case against Ahmed Ghailani, who was not a citizen of the U.S., some
evidence was excluded because it was gathered through illegitimate means, namely
“physical and psychological abuse of the defendant.”38 In a telling statement, an opponent
declared that this use of due process was improper, since it afforded al-Qaeda terrorists
the same due process rights as American citizens.39 This statement implies that “the
outgroup not entitled to due process may be any noncitizen.”40 However, how should the
Constitution be interpreted when the terrorist in question is an American citizen?
Robertson contends that “the legal doctrine of constitutional due process protects against
a desire to withhold legal protections from those perceived to be enemies.”41 While those
enemies might originate predominantly from outside the United States, a number of
American citizens have also become enemies of the U.S.
Due Process and Targeting of American Citizens
At the heart of the debate about targeted killing is the government’s ability to
order the death of an American citizen through a targeted strike. In September 2011,
Anwar Al-Awlaki, an American citizen, was targeted by a drone strike in Yemen and
killed. Prior to Al-Awlaki’s death, his father, Nasser Al-Aulaqui, brought forward a case
37. Marshall Thompson, “The legality of armed drone strikes against U.S. citizens within the
United States,” Brigham Young University Law Review 2013, no. 1 (2013): 164,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1346347608?accountid=12085 (accessed February 1, 2014).
38. Cassandra Burke Robertson, “Due Process in the American Identity,” Alabama Law Review 64
(2012): 273, LexisNexis Academic (accessed January 29, 2014). Ahmed Ghailani was born in Tanzania
and retains Tanzanian citizenship.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 274.
41. Ibid., 281.
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against President Obama, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and CIA Director Leon
Panetta in the federal district court of the District of Columbia.42 In this case, the Court
dismissed the case before substantively dealing with its implications for due process.
Regardless, Benjamin McKelvey explains that if the Court had utilized the balancing test
in this instance, the first and third factors would have collided.43 He notes that “[t]he
deprivation in question was Aulaqi’s life, the most serious deprivation in law…the
deprivation of life is permanent. However, the government's interest in protecting
American citizens from the unrelenting threat of terrorism is also compelling.”44 The
seriousness of deprivation of life, as well as the singular nature of the Al-Awlaki killing
makes it quite useful to examine in depth.
The DOJ’s justification of the killing of Al-Awlaki. In order to justify the
targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, the Department of Justice (DOJ) retroactively
produced a White Paper that defends the president’s decision to eliminate an American
citizen. The DOJ does confirm that even while abroad a citizen carries along his or her
Fifth Amendment due process rights and Fourth Amendment rights; however, the DOJ is
quick to point out that the “citizenship of a leader of al-Qa’ida…does not give that person
constitutional immunity from attack.”45 Although the Constitution does not grant absolute
immunity from punishment for citizens, it establishes that any penalty be conducted in
42. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
43. Benjamin McKelvey, “Due Process Rights And The Targeted Killing Of Suspected Terrorists:
The Unconstitutional Scope Of Executive Killing Power,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 44, no.
5 (November 2011): 1370, HeinOnline (accessed February 24, 2014).
44. Ibid.
45. Department of Justice, “Lawfulness Of A Lethal Operation Directed Against A U.S. Citizen
Who Is A Senior Operational Leader Of Al-Qa’ida Or An Associated Force,” White Paper (February 4,
2013): 5, http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf (accessed
February 2, 2014).
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consistency with due process. After confirming the existence of the rights due a citizen of
the U.S., the DOJ expounds that in order to determine the process due a citizen the
private interests involved and the burdens that the government should undertake in order
to provide greater due process must be contrasted.46 While the government recognizes
that there is no higher private interest than a person protecting their own life, this interest
must be balanced against the “government’s interest in waging war, protecting its
citizens, and removing the threat posed by members of enemy forces.”47 The logical
assumption would be to suppose that the government had used a balancing test similar to
that which the Supreme Court implements. What is problematic is the lack of explanation
offered regarding how this scale is interpreted and weighed by the executive branch.
Since the decision-making process is done in secret, the public aspect that the Supreme
Court would allow for is also missing. The determination by the government lacks
specific justification as well as a methodology for evaluating the appropriate level of due
process to be provided. Going beyond the inherent problems that the balancing test elicits
in the first place, the use of this test by the executive branch is concerning. Even if the
executive branch properly used the Supreme Court’s balancing test, there is no clear
reason as to why the president and other high-level officials have the authority to conduct
such a test.
In regard to the Fourth Amendment, the DOJ uses a similar justification that
balances the individual’s interests against that of the government’s.48 Crucial to this
justification is the “reasonableness” test, which differentiates between searches and
46. Department of Justice, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation,” 6.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., 9.
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seizures classified as reasonable or unreasonable as was mentioned in the discussion on
the Fourth Amendment. The White Paper claims that the “‘reasonableness’ test is
situation-dependent.”49 The nature of the DOJ’s argument in this instance gains some
latitude, since it is typically up to the discretion of the responding officer whether
initiating a search is warranted. If a hypothetical scenario does in fact meet the
government’s idea of an imminent attack, where “the targeted person is an operational
leader of an enemy force and an informed, high-level government official has determined
that he poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States, and those
conducting the operation would carry out the operation only if capture were infeasible,”
there would seem to be a reasonable level of suspicion to conduct a seizure.50 Although in
a perfect scenario this situation might prove reasonable, the executive is not held
accountable if the seizure was later determined to be unreasonable. There is also no
process for petition within the court system against the executive, and the decision would
most likely be made in secret with no verification from an “informed, high-level official
of the U.S. government.”51
Before the White Paper was released, various news sources reported small
snippets of the process that the executive branch used to make the decision to target AlAwlaki. For example, the New York Times revealed that “President Obama’s National
Security Council had to approve the order to pursue him [al-Awlaki] with lethal force,”
although there is no clear explanation of why this “approval was necessary or

49. Department of Justice, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation,” 9.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., 6.
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constitutionally satisfactory.”52 McKelvey details that current and former government
officials, such as former CIA officer Bruce Reidel, have offered words of assurance and
nominal amounts of information on the process that the executive branch takes in such
cases. He claims that the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center directs ten attorneys to review
evidence against a potential target and submit memos to the General Counsel that are
rigorously reviewed before a final decision is rendered.53 Besides assurances about the
process, a detailed description is never given, nor any method of auditing the program
provided. Either the way the CIA evaluates evidence, or determines what “standard of
proof” is necessary, is never explicated.54
Additionally, the National Security Council decided it was more appropriate to
“view the legality of this killing” under international law rather than domestic law.55 This
decision to defer to international standards before domestic ones is inconsistent with the
Constitution and reinforces the irresponsible nature of the Administration’s policies. At
the very minimum, the decision should have been made consistent with both international
and constitutional law, rather than ignoring the constitutional protections that every
citizen possesses and deferring to international law instead.56
To date, this White Paper is the most comprehensive justification released by the
current administration. As the White Paper indicates, the explanations serve only to

52. McKelvey, “Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists,” 1358.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ryan Patrick Alford, “The Rule of Law at the Crossroads: Consequences of Targeted Killing
of Citizens,” Utah Law Review 4 (March 7, 2011): 1253, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1780584 (accessed
February 2, 2014).
56. Ibid.
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validate the elimination of a U.S. citizen who is acting as a “senior operational leader of
al-Qa’ida,” and not establish the minimum requirements for carrying out an attack against
another U.S. citizen or foreign national.57 The otherwise lack of justification of President
Obama’s increasing use of drone strikes is disturbing. Although the White Paper
purportedly substantiates the legality of killing an American citizen who is a leader of a
terrorist organization (clearly a reference to al-Awlaki), its argument is weak at best. It
fails to address the substantive issues of constitutional law; however, these arguments
only touch the surface of the issue and typically end in the premature phrase “an
operation in the circumstances and under the constraints described above would not result
in a violation of due process rights.”58 The problem is succinctly summed up by Deborah
Pearlstein, who explains that in order to justify the legality of targeted killings, the White
Paper would have to both “identify a source of authority in the U.S. Constitution, or in
laws passed by Congress, that gives the president the power to use force” and “identify
and apply the U.S. and international laws that limit when such force can be used.”59 In
the end, the White Paper does neither.
While the government hints at the president’s ability to use force to defend the
nation, the paper does not even address any specific provision of the Constitution or of
Article II, failing to explain what is meant by the president’s “constitutional

57. Department of Justice, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation,” 1.
58. Ibid., 9.
59. Deborah Pearlstein, “Targeted Killings Can Be Legal: But The Obama Administration’s White
Paper Fails To Explain Why,” Slate (February 8, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/02/white_paper_on_drones_targeted_
killings_can_be_legal_but_the_obama_administration.html (accessed February 2, 2014).
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responsibility to defend the nation.”60 The White Paper mentions utilizing the AUMF as a
justification, but it never addresses the obligation that the president has to restrict the
powers derived from AUMF to only what is legal under international law.61 Since the
DOJ fails to “identify a legal rule about who is targetable under the law of war,” the
arguments laid forth by the administration are at best incomplete.62 As a result, the
Obama Administration must provide a substantial justification under international law if
it is to defer to the AUMF for its validation.
Assuming that the AUMF’s allowance of unrestrained military action against
those accused of terrorism is dubious, judicial review is necessary to limit the scope of
executive power in this context and prevent the eschewing of due process. McKelvey
explains that “there is ample precedent to suggest that the scope of congressionally
authorized war power is a matter subject to judicial review and not an exclusively
political question.”63 In its defense in the matter, the DOJ argued that the political
question doctrine established Al-Aulaqui’s lack of standing to bring his claim to court.64
If the court exercised its ability to review the scope of the AUMF, it would discover the
potentially extensive nature that an unrestrained allowance would justify. Such an
“interpretation would allow the Executive to use lethal force against any person,
anywhere in the world, simply by accusing that person of a relationship to terrorist

60. Pearlstein, “Targeted Killings Can Be Legal.”
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. McKelvey, Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists,” 1364.
64. Ibid., 1356.
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organizations that were involved in the September 11 attacks.”65 The sweeping nature of
that interpretation would likely invalidate the application of due process rights in the
name of national security.
Overall, the arguments the DOJ presents to validate its targeted killing policy,
albeit an extremely limited portion of that policy, are largely defensive and do not
provide true guidance of their legality. Its discussion of due process does begin to explain
why the government’s policy is not a violation of certain amendments; however, it never
reaches the point of identifying where the Constitution gives the president the authority to
conduct such an operation. The absence of a prohibition in the Constitution is not
equivalent to a grant of executive power.
Constitutional rights and the location of citizens. Supreme Court precedent
supports the idea that the U.S. cannot act “against citizens abroad…free of the Bill or
Rights.”66 In the plurality opinion of the Court in Reid v. Covert, Justice Hugo L. Black
maintains that “[w]hen the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the
shield which the Bill or Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his
life and liberty should not be stripped away.”67 Reid v. Covert addresses the case of
Clarice Covert who “killed her husband, a sergeant in the United States Air Force, at an

65. McKelvey, Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists,” 1365.
66. Reid, Superintendent, District of Columbia Jail, v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), 5. Justice Hugo
L. Black wrote the plurality opinion of the court. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice William O. Douglas
and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined him. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice John Marshall Harlan
II concurred on different grounds. Justice Tom C. Clark, who was joined by Justice Harold Burton,
dissented.
67. Ibid., 6.
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airbase in England.”68 Despite the fact she was not a member of the armed services a
court-martial tried her under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.69
Even though Reid v. Covert does not assume the context of terrorism, the plurality
opinion requires the DOJ to consider the Fifth Amendment rights of a citizen regardless
of their physical location. In addition, the plurality agreed that “no agreement with a
foreign nation can confer on Congress or any other branch of the Government power
which is free from the restraints of the Constitution,” reaffirming the sole authority of the
Constitution as the law of the land and its application to all government power.70 Since
the court determined that “under our Constitution courts of law alone are given power to
try civilians for their offenses against the United States,” a decision by the executive
branch to target an American citizen, an action that affords significantly less process than
a military tribunal, would also be illegitimate.71 Neither the executive branch nor the U.S.
military have the authority to condemn a civilian based upon their own determinations,
regardless of the citizen’s physical location.
Scholarly support of the targeted killing of citizens. Some scholars support the
decision to kill American citizens involved in the operations of a terrorist organization,
such as al-Qaeda. John Yoo contends that criticisms of the president’s authority to kill
American citizens abroad accused of terrorism stem from misconceptions of the nature of

68. Reid v. Covert, 3.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid., 2.
71. Ibid., 40-41.
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the War on Terror.72 He contends that the targeted killing of American citizens is
consistent with the Constitution, “[b]ecause the United States is at war with al-Qaeda, it
can use force-especially targeted force-to conduct hostilities against the enemy’s
leaders.”73 Yoo cites the example of Kamal Derwish, an American citizen killed by a
drone strike in Yemen, “who was said to be the leader of an al-Qaeda sleeper cell” found
in Buffalo, New York.74 After other members of the cell were arrested and plead guilty,
Derwish fled to Yemen, and was subsequently killed by a CIA drone strike.75 Yoo
defends the targeting of Derwish, explaining:
Launching a missile to kill al-Qaeda commanders like Derwish, even though he
was an American citizen, is legal. They are members of the enemy forces, the
equivalent of officers – Derwish amounted to a captain or major in command of
al-Qaeda cells, the equivalent of enemy military units. The U.S. military and
intelligence services are legally and morally free to target them for attack whether
they were on the front lines or behind them.76
Even though Yoo presents a compelling case, there are some differences relative
to al-Awlaki’s case that are worth mentioning. Derwish’s cohort was accused of terrorism
and given the opportunity to appear in court. Derwish himself never had that opportunity
because he fled to a foreign nation instead. Nevertheless, Yoo never establishes where the
president has authority to commit such an act of war. The War on Terror was never
legitimized by a declaration of war from Congress, and as discussed earlier, the AUMF is
a questionable justification of the president’s ability to remove a citizen’s right to life.
72. John Yoo, “Assassination or Targeted Killings after 9/11,” New York Law School Review 56
(2011): 63, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2215&context=facpubs
(accessed February 14, 2014).
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., 58.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid., 65.
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Yoo must provide a substantial defense of the President’s ability to forgo due process if
he is to declare that a targeted killing of American citizens is justified. Thus, a closer look
at the case of Al-Awlaki and how it relates to executive power and the deprivation of due
process is crucial to understanding the Constitution’s position on such matters.
Al-Awlaki’s Case and the Conflict Between Due Process and Executive Power
In addressing the situation of al-Awlaki, it is important to examine the
precedential nature of the instance of targeting an American citizen without incorporating
the judicial or legislative branches. Alford invokes the case of David ap Gruffydd, who
was targeted by Edward I to be killed via an “executive order” or its equivalent in the
thirteenth century.77 He expounds that this instance “was the last time that the executive
branch of any common law country, without the involvement of its judicial or the
legislative branches, asserted that it was legal to kill a citizen on the basis of an executive
order,” until the killing of al-Awlaki.78 Instances of excessive executive prerogative like
this explain why the framers intended to prevent the “arbitrary judgment of kings,” and
instead favor the “support of the rule of law.”79 Alford contends that the killing of alAwlaki is another example of improper executive behavior, since he was “effectively
labeled a traitor” but was not provided the proper due process or tried in the proper court
in person or in absentia.80 It is important to remember a formal charge was never brought
against Al-Awlaki. Although high treason would appear to be a fitting charge, the
government never clarified Al-Awlaki’s crime.
77. Alford, “The Rule of Law at the Crossroads,” 1204. More traditionally spelled Dafydd ap
Gruffydd. He “was a Welsh prince” and “the last ruler of an independent Wales.”
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., 1209.
80. Ibid., 1220.

TARGETED KILLING

26

To emphasize the serious nature of the President’s decision to target a U.S. citizen
without proper due process standards, Alford concludes:
To allow the president to operate above the Constitution (by placing his actions
above constitutional review, even when they are precisely those behaviors that the
Constitution was created to constrain) is to secretly overthrow the rule of law, and
to walk a path which in the past has led directly to repression, totalitarianism, and
ultimately, destruction.81
Clearly, a new or modified framework must be sought in order to make current
U.S. targeted-killing policy consistent with the Constitution. The violation of the
Constitution is not isolated to an abrogation of the Fifth Amendment.
The Bill of Attainder and its relation to due process. As was described earlier,
the provision of the Fifth Amendment never existed in a vacuum; historical context and
the experiences of the framers influenced its creation and underlying intention. Since
some framers viewed the Bill of Rights as unnecessary, it would make sense that other
parts of the Constitution also provide procedures for due process. The Constitution says,
“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”82 The Heritage Guide to the
Constitution indicates that “[i]n common law, bills of attainder were legislative acts that,
without trial, condemned specifically designated persons or groups to death.”83 Even
though the Bill of Attainder clause restricts Congress’s authority ability to violate due
process, viewing the history of Bills of Attainder reveals it was intended to restrict the
executive as well.

81. Alford, “The Rule of Law at the Crossroads,” 1270.
82. U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sect. 9, clause 3.
83. Daniel Troy, “Bill of Attainder,” The Heritage Guide to the Constitution (2012),
http://www.heritage.org/constitution#!/articles/1/essays/62/bill-of-attainder (accessed March 3, 2014).
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Although some historical dispute existed over the authority of the legislature to
try a citizen for treason, the authority of the executive to do so is largely dismissed as
untenable and irrelevant. For example, Alford purports that Alexander Hamilton
recognized that there was a long-going dispute at the time of the ratification of the
Constitution whether or not the legislature could exact punishment on citizens for high
treason.84 On the other hand, “there was no contemporary dispute over the purported
power of the executive to punish—this issue had been decided in the negative a century
earlier.”85 The lack of an explicit clause of this fact in the Constitution only amplified the
consensus that existed on the matter, rather than leaving the option open that the
executive could punish citizens for treason.86 Thus, it appeared that there was widespread
agreement at the time of ratification that the President should not have the power to try a
citizen for treason. Ironically, this is very similar to what had happened to Al-Awlaki.
More so, it would appear that the a citizen who is guilty of treason against the
United States must be tried according the to Treason Clause in “open court.”87 Instead of
being subject to military tribunals, the text of the Article 3 clause suggests that such
crimes are to be tried in a civilian court.88 In addition, Alford contends that the “the
special procedural and evidentiary protections specified in the Treason Clause…exceed
even the protections of the Bill of Rights.”89 As a result, if al-Awlaki’s case had been

84. Alford, “The Rule of Law at the Crossroads,” 1215.
85. Ibid.
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87. U.S. Constitution, art. 3, sect. 3, clause 1.
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properly adjudicated, it should have been tried in a civilian court rather than a military
tribunal. Since Congress governs the President’s ability to initiate acts of war or other
actions that would not reach that level of conflict, deferring to the Article II powers of the
executive appears to be illegitimate.90
Since Anwar al-Awlaki’s case typifies the problem with the United States’ policy
of targeted killing, it is unfortunate that the substantive merits of the case were never
developed. Instead, the District Court dimissed Nasser Al-Aulaqui’s claims on the
grounds of its non-justiciability under the political question doctrine.91 The expansion of
executive power at the cost of due process is not a development specific to Al-Awlaki’s
case; it began at the outset of the declared “War on Terror.”
A history of executive power in the war on terror. The presidency of George
W. Bush saw the greatest onset of terrorism, and the development of a global war on
terrorism. The Bush administration increased the use of terrorist holding military prisms,
such as Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and stepped up its efforts to apprehend and eliminate
terrorists. During his pursuit of the presidency, Barack Obama promised he would strive
to bring US counterterrorism policies in line with legal restraints.92 Clearly, the opposite
has occurred as the Obama Administration has massively increased the use of drone
strikes without subsequent increases in congressional or constitutional oversight. Instead,
the norm has been extrajudicial killings solely decided by the president and his advisors
without significant or defined legal restrictions.

90. Alford, “The Rule of Law at the Crossroads,” 1218.
91. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010), 80.
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The expectation of the Obama Administration is quite broad regarding its own
authority to determine when targeted killings are necessary or justified. For example,
returning the DOJ’s White Paper, “the Obama administration argued that it has domestic
legal authority to use drones globally and to kill its own citizens, since the Authorization
for the Use of Military Force empowers the president ‘to use all necessary and
appropriate force’ in pursuit of those responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks.”93 This
assertion, however, does not establish “domestic legal authority” as equivalent to
constitutional law. Even if the President is authorized to eliminate terrorists via targeted
killings in a manner consistent with international law, this cannot mean that the
Constitution no longer applies to presidential actions. In the final analysis, the
Constitution should decide the extent of executive discretion in the context of targeted
killing.
One of the main arguments consistently leveled by supporters of executive
prerogative is that the context of the War on Terror requires an increased amount of
military flexibility that only the President can effectively utilize. This is false for a few
reasons. First, the executive responsibility to defend the nation is consistent with the
President’s responsibility to uphold the laws of the United States. Unfortunately, it is
becoming the commonly accepted view, where “the president's constitutional
responsibility to act within the law…is secondary to his constitutional duty to defend and
protect the country.”94 The Bush Administration also operated under this view to a

93. Dawood I. Ahmed, “Rethinking Anti-Drone Legal Strategies: Questioning Pakistani and
Yemeni ‘Consent’,” Yale Journal of International Affairs 8 (June 11, 2013): 4, HeinOnline (accessed
February 2, 2014).
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significant extent, as the existential nature of the threat of terrorism could be legitimately
combated outside constitutional means. In essence, “restraints on the power of the
president, according to the Cheney-Addington view, necessarily diminish the capacity of
the country’s national-security agencies to respond effectively.”95
Therefore, do the new threat dimensions of terrorism, especially of the WMD
variety, invalidate or ineffectuate due process norms? One problem with adopting this
view is that counterterrorist policies are made to be just as “improvisational” as the new
strategies of terrorist organizations, and hence becoming more ad hoc.96 This ad hoc
nature of counterterrorism policies is inherently problematic, because procedural methods
that have survived via trial and error are jettisoned for the sake of expediency or ease.
Complications almost always accompany threatening environments and overwhelming
dangers can distract from less visible but still harmful effects. Rules and precautions
prevent the pressure of acting in disaster situations from clouding a policymaker’s
judgment and exacerbating the situation.97
Additionally, relying on rule-based approaches does not hamper the effectiveness
of national security policy. While flexibility in national-security policy is important, a
situation may not always be completely understood, making it crucial to implement rules.
This does not necessarily constrain executive authority, but instead poor decisionmaking.98 In his article, Holmes relies on the analogy of responding to hospital
emergencies, and shows how this can specifically apply to issues of national security by
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positing how “the importance of training, disciplining, and coordinating the behavior of
front-line emergency responders reinforces the suspicion that rules may be just as crucial
for managing national-security crises as for handling life-and-death situations in the
hospital.”99 Increased accountability is likely to support the ability of the nation and the
president to combat the threat of terrorism, rather than constrain the president from
effective action. Insulating the executive will not increase security, but instead prevent
accountability and rational action as well as undermine both security and liberty.100
Holmes argues that “shielding government incompetence from public view may damage
national security by delaying the correction of potentially lethal mistakes.”101 While
supporters of executive discretion might propose that legal restrictions preclude
effectiveness, they fail to balance this assertion with how the lack of constitutional
regulation “can encourage irresponsible, profligate, and self-defeating choices.”102
In the final analysis, removing restrictions on presidential power as an effective
national security policy does not have any substantiated basis in reality:
To prevent the president and his subordinates from being “strangled by law,”
especially in moments of grave danger, advocates argue that restrictive
regulations must be replaced by broad grants of discretion or enabling acts that
effectively turn Congress and the courts into passive and ill-informed observers of
unilateral executive action. This arrangement makes sense, needless to say, only if
its proponents are correct to argue that unrestrained power, by definition, is
effective power.103
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Although Holmes comments on the failures of the Bush Administration, his
arguments still have useful application for the Obama Administration. He attacks the
underlying assertion that executive discretion is the most effective means to respond to
the unique threat of terrorism. This view favoring executive discretion was present in the
Bush Administration’s policies, and core assumption current in the Obama
Administration’s policy of targeted killing. Avoiding congressional oversight, the input
of publicly verifiable scrutiny, or review by judicial, means risks the abrogation of due
process as well, and enhances questionable decision-making by the executive branch.
Admittedly, one major difference between the administrations is that President Bush was
largely responding to the massive attacks of 9/11, which tempers criticism of his
decision-making in invading Iraq. President Obama had more precedent to work with,
which should have informed his policies. Despite this, the ad hoc nature of much of
President Obama’s decisions makes his targeted killing policy more frustrating and
confusing. Essentially, if the President can effectively abrogate any citizen’s rights to due
process or life within an unaccountable framework, then the Constitution’s restraints
upon him are not binding law. Without the proper checks and balances on executive
action, death warrants could be issued for lesser offenses. This concern is consistent with
the majority opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. Justice O’Connor argues that war “is not a
blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens,” but
that executive powers granted by the Constitution must also be subject to “a role for all
three branches when individual liberties are at stake.”104 As a result, a targeted killing
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policy that incorporates the three branches and observes the due process rights of citizens
should be sought after.
A Potential Solution to the Issues Surrounding Targeted Killing
What is needed is a specific format for conducting targeted killings that is
constitutional and can be regulated by the other branches of government to public
knowledge. A framework that achieves this level of accountability can effectively address
national security concerns while protecting individual right due process guarantees in the
Constitution. The analysis of Evers-Mushovic and Hughes provides a fairly
comprehensive example crafted specifically for the United States. Their approach
incorporates specific rules of engagement (ROEs) and administrative measures that
intend to guide the administrative process and provide restrictions on unregulated
executive power.105
The rules of engagement provided deal with the conditions upon which the U.S.
may target an American citizen. First, they state that the location of the terrorist may
preclude capture. Unlike what the current administration has determined as an infeasible
capture, Evers-Mushovic and Hughes recommend, “It is both sound legal and warfighting policy to attempt to capture an American terrorist before targeting him.”106 The
U.S. must make a serious effort to apprehend the target, even if it must request
permission from a foreign government to do so. This approach will improve the
perception of the U.S. on the international front, as well as assist in forging alliances and
cooperative partnerships against terrorist organizations. Second, the target must take
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direct part in hostilities.107 This facet is quite similar to what is found in international law
and already appears to be an aspect of the current administration’s policy, as mentioned
previously.
Evers-Mushovic and Hughes also provide two administrative procedures to
enhance accountability. First, they propose that the president himself should place the
individual on the High Value Individuals (HVI) list, which is effectively the kill list of
the U.S.108 This authority should not be delegated to a non-elected official of the
executive branch, but executed in a manner that allows for public accountability, because
the public “must have the ability to send a message at the ballot box by voting out a
single official.”109 While President Obama could still receive advice and counsel from his
advisors concerning a target, it would be necessary for him to officially make the
decision to target an individual. The second administrative procedure outlined is to
undertake an independent and impartial investigation of the targeted killing. EversMushovic and Hughes recommend that this be done post-operationally, “because a preoperation investigation and hearing through the courts is impractical.”110 Although this
would be inconsistent with the arguments that Alford puts forward regarding due process
and the targeting of al-Awlaki, it might be necessary to garner approval from Congress.
The authors also impress that it is crucial to find a way to disclose the results of this
review to the public without compromising national security.111
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It is worth noting that Holmes does address the concern of disclosing highly
sensitive counterterrorism methods, even if it is made in the context of U.S. detainment
practices. He expounds the importance of public trials and disclosure, even if they
“expose the sources and methods of U.S. counterterrorism agencies” to an extent;
otherwise, “trials conducted on the basis of undisclosed information, will likely cause
equivalent damage, due to the perverse incentives that they engender.”112 The potential
costs of an unaccountable executive not “enforced by habeas and other forms of judicial
oversight” are worth considering in light of the security tradeoffs that disclosure
entails.113 Although no suggestion will be perfect, considering solutions like the ones
described is crucial if any progress is to even be made on this issue. As public approval of
the administration continues to fall, resolutions to the problem will likely be sought more
intently. Thus, considering options and formulating new solutions is a key part of this
investigation.
Conclusion
Since the terrorism is a very real threat, policies that counteract terrorist actions,
such as drone strikes, are a significant part of national security policy. As a result, the
targeted killing policy of the United States is quite active and continuously developing. In
fact, “The Obama administration is considering a drone attack against an American
believed to be associated with al Qaeda,” which is supposed to incorporate recent
changes in the president’s policy governing the use of drones.114 Even though the new
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policy requires that “the Justice Department must review any decision to add Americans
to the target list,”115 there still appears to be little accountability as the decision-making
process is contained within the executive branch. The problems surrounding U.S. targeted
killing policies are by no means resolved, and the fact that the government is considering
another strike against a U.S. citizen emphasizes the need for further review of these
policies.
As a nation of laws and limited government, the United States has survived nearly
250 years while preserving the freedom of individual citizens and resident aliens. The
extension of U.S. targeted killing policy has uniquely threatened that freedom by
abrogating due process rights and expanding unaccountable presidential authority. The
Constitution establishes clear rules of the allocation of power and where the executive
branch is constrained. Therefore, an approach that ensures American citizens the rights of
due process should continue as constitutional law despite a war on terror. Examining into
the history of due process is critical to determining the original intentions of the framers
as well as deciding how the Constitution limits the use of targeted killing against
American citizens. This paper concludes that the due process procedures contained in the
Fifth Amendment and other parts of the Constitution such as the Bill of Attainder and
Treason clauses prohibit the government from killing American citizens without trial.
This is supported by Supreme Court precedent in Hamdi v. Rumsefeld, which supports
that citizens who are allegedly opposing the United States are still owed constitutional
due process; additionally, Reid v. Covert, holds that citizens of the U.S. are to be offered
due process consistent with a civilian court of law regardless of their physical location.
Although solutions do exist to help mitigate the problematic effects of targeted killing
115. Barnes and Gorman, “U.S. Looks To Target American With Drone.”
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policy, none of them are as simple as would be preferred. Regardless, restricting targeted
killing policy to constitutional authority is necessary to preserve the limited government
that the framers intended and uphold the right of due process.
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